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Tier B Enterprise Fleet · 12-Language Immunity EngineAutoExtinguish: false (MCP Referee)

AutoExtinguish: false — JWKS keys and algorithm allowlists are architectural; verify candidate fixes locally via ciphermap mcp.

Commercial boundary: ciphermap immunity scan, immunity extinguish --apply, immunity attest (CycloneDX 1.6 CISA IBOM & OpenVEX 0.2.0), and ciphermap mcp require Tier B Enterprise Fleet. Offline proof and IBOM verification (--verify-proof, attest --verify) and the ciphermap demo sandbox run Free.

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IMM-JWT-001CRITICALCISA Secure-by-Design Pledge · CWE-347 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (IA-5, SI-10)

Unverified JWT Signature Decoding Before Claims Trust

Severity: CRITICAL

Calling unverified JWT decode helpers (such as Go jwt.Parser.ParseUnverified, Python jwt.decode(..., options={'verify_signature': False}), Node jsonwebtoken.decode / jose.decodeJwt, or Java Jwts.parser().parseClaimsJwt) allows an attacker to forge arbitrary subject, tenant, or role claims including alg:none or algorithm-confusion payloads. Because verification keys, JWKS endpoints, and allowed signing algorithms (e.g., ES256 or composite ML-DSA-65) depend on your identity architecture, IMM-JWT-001 sets AutoExtinguish: false and routes candidate patches through the local ciphermap mcp referee.

Remediation checklist

  • Replace unverified decode helpers with signature-verifying parsers (Go jwt.ParseWithClaims + jwt.WithValidMethods, PyJWT jwt.decode with explicit algorithms=[...], Node jose.jwtVerify).
  • Pin an explicit allowlist of asymmetric or composite PQC algorithms and reject 'none' or unexpected symmetric HS256 fallbacks on asymmetric public keys.
  • Verify issuer (iss), audience (aud), and expiration (exp) claims alongside cryptographic signature validation.

Illustrative Code Examples

These fragments explain migration direction. They are not complete applications or compiler-verified patches for your project.

Vulnerable — trusting claims from an unverified JWT decode

terminal · zsh
# Python PyJWT: signature verification explicitly bypassed
claims = jwt.decode(bearer_token, options={"verify_signature": False})
return load_tenant_account(claims["sub"])

Remediated — cryptographic verification + pinned algorithm allowlist

terminal · zsh
# Python PyJWT: verifies signature and pins allowed asymmetric algorithm
claims = jwt.decode(
    bearer_token,
    jwks_signing_key,
    algorithms=["ES256"],
    audience="https://api.example.com",
)
return load_tenant_account(claims["sub"])

Scan your own repository for IMM-JWT-001 locally (0 code egress)

Preview proposed changes free with ciphermap fix . --dry-run --offline --no-telemetry. Eligibility depends on the installed build, call shape, module format, and migration context. The bundled RSA fixture has a classical key-size candidate; that does not make it post-quantum secure. Persisted digests and unsupported contexts may be declined. Applying supported candidates requires an entitlement, explicit verifier consent, and the required project tools. Review the actual verification result before adopting a change.

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