Banking TR-31/TR-34 Key Blocks, Mainframe ICSF & Open Banking FAPI 2.0
Severity: HIGH
Financial payment rails combine strict symmetric key-block hygiene with long-lived asymmetric PKI across ATMs, POS terminals, HSMs, IBM z/OS ICSF mainframes, and Open Banking APIs. CipherMap flags legacy DES/TDEA TR-31 Version A/B/C key headers (PQC-BANK-003), classical RSA-2048 CMS key transport in TR-34 / X9.24-2 Remote Key Loading and 64-bit ANSI X9.9/X9.19 Retail MACs (PQC-BANK-005), z/OS ICSF CSNB* classical token verbs, and Open Banking FAPI 2.0 / PSD3 profiles pinned exclusively to PS256 or ES256 without hybrid mTLS or post-quantum JWS agility (PQC-BANK-006).
Remediation checklist
- Migrate legacy TR-31 Version A/B/C key blocks to Version D AES Key Derivation Binding and replace ANSI X9.9/X9.19 3DES MACs with AES-128/256-CMAC.
- Plan ATM/POS TR-34 Remote Key Loading upgrades to hybrid ML-KEM-768 + RSA-OAEP-3072 CMS key transport and PKCS#11 v3.2 CKM_ML_KEM / CKM_ML_DSA HSM mechanisms.
- Shield Open Banking FAPI 2.0 ingress gateways immediately with hybrid X25519MLKEM768 mTLS via ciphermap fix . --wrapper envoy --offline while staging composite ML-DSA-65 + ES256 JWS/DPoP tokens.
Illustrative Code Examples
These fragments explain migration direction. They are not complete applications or compiler-verified patches for your project.
Vulnerable — classical TR-34 RSA-2048 RKL & PS256-only FAPI 2.0 DPoP profile
const fapiConfig = {
rklProfile: "TR34_2PASS_RSA_2048",
iso8583Mac: "ANSI_X9_19_3DES",
dpopSigningAlgValuesSupported: ["PS256", "ES256"],
}Migration direction — AES-CMAC + TR-31 Version D + composite ML-DSA-65 FAPI 2.0 agility
const fapiConfig = {
keyBlockVersion: "TR31_VERSION_D_AES256",
iso8583Mac: "AES_256_CMAC",
dpopSigningAlgValuesSupported: ["ML-DSA-65-ES256", "ES256"],
}Scan your own repository for PQC-BANK-002 locally (0 code egress)
Preview proposed changes free with ciphermap fix . --dry-run --offline --no-telemetry. Eligibility depends on the installed build, call shape, module format, and migration context. The bundled RSA fixture has a classical key-size candidate; that does not make it post-quantum secure. Persisted digests and unsupported contexts may be declined. Applying supported candidates requires an entitlement, explicit verifier consent, and the required project tools. Review the actual verification result before adopting a change.
Other rule families
Quantum-Vulnerable Public Key (RSA / DSA / DH)
PQC-GO-AST-003Quantum-Vulnerable Elliptic Curves (ECC) & Pre-Standard PQC Drafts
PQC-GO-AST-001Deprecated & Broken Cryptographic Primitives
IMM-SQLI-001Dynamic SQL String Interpolation or Concatenation Across Polyglot Drivers
IMM-PATH-001Unjailed Filesystem Path Traversal or Symlink Escape Across Polyglot I/O
IMM-CMD-001Dynamic Shell Command Execution Across Polyglot Process APIs
IMM-BOUND-001Unbounded Stream or Payload Allocation Across Polyglot Boundaries
IMM-DESER-001Unsafe Polymorphic Deserialization or Permissive Boundary Decoding
IMM-AUTH-001Unauthenticated or Unguarded State-Mutating Boundary Endpoint
IMM-TIMING-001Non-Constant-Time Secret, HMAC, or Webhook Signature Comparison
IMM-JWT-001Unverified JWT Signature Decoding Before Claims Trust
IMM-SSRF-001Unvalidated Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) & Cloud IMDS Exposure
IMM-AICFG-001AI Coding Agent Instruction & MCP Configuration Poisoning
IMM-CSPRNG-001Weak Non-Cryptographic PRNG in Security Token, OTP, or Secret Generation
IMM-REDIR-001Unvalidated Open Redirect from Raw HTTP Parameter
PQC-COOKIE-4KPQC Wire-Size Rollout Cliffs: 4KB Cookies, SQL VARCHAR(255) & HTTP 431 Headers
PQC-FED-001NSA CNSA 2.0 Category-5 Floor, PIV/CAC & Firmware Signatures
PQC-IAM-001Identity (OIDC / SAML / FIDO2 WebAuthn) & Cloud KMS Envelope Keys
PQC-OT-001OT/ICS OPC UA, IEC 62443 Secure Boot & Healthcare DICOM/HL7 FHIR