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Tier B Enterprise Fleet · 12-Language Immunity EngineAutoExtinguish: true (4-Gate Vericoding)

AutoExtinguish: true — emits self-contained or shared SSRF URL/IP guardrails verified across 4 sandbox gates.

Commercial boundary: ciphermap immunity scan, immunity extinguish --apply, immunity attest (CycloneDX 1.6 CISA IBOM & OpenVEX 0.2.0), and ciphermap mcp require Tier B Enterprise Fleet. Offline proof and IBOM verification (--verify-proof, attest --verify) and the ciphermap demo sandbox run Free.

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IMM-SSRF-001HIGHCISA Secure-by-Design Pledge · CWE-918 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (SC-7, SI-10)

Unvalidated Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) & Cloud IMDS Exposure

Severity: HIGH

Passing untrusted webhook, OIDC request_uri, or avatar/import URLs directly into outbound HTTP clients (http.Get, fetch, axios, requests.get, HttpClient) exposes cloud instance metadata services (169.254.169.254, fd00:ec2::254), localhost admin ports, and internal VPC endpoints. IMM-SSRF-001 detects untrusted outbound URL sinks across 12 languages and synthesizes runtime SSRF guardrails blocking non-HTTPS schemes, loopback, RFC-1918/RFC-4193 private ranges, link-local IMDS, and IPv4-mapped/NAT64/6to4/Teredo IPv6 bypasses.

Remediation checklist

  • Parse outbound URLs and enforce an explicit https:// scheme plus an application-level destination hostname allowlist where applicable.
  • Resolve DNS and validate the connected peer IP inside a custom dialer/transport hook so DNS-rebinding and HTTP redirect hops cannot pivot to 127.0.0.0/8, 169.254.0.0/16, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, fc00::/7, or IPv6 transition prefixes (64:ff9b::/96, 2002::/16, 2001:0000::/32).
  • Cap response body reads with bounded readers (IMM-BOUND-001) to prevent memory exhaustion from rogue upstream endpoints.

Illustrative Code Examples

These fragments explain migration direction. They are not complete applications or compiler-verified patches for your project.

Vulnerable — direct outbound fetch on caller-supplied webhook URL

terminal · zsh
// TypeScript: reaches 169.254.169.254 or internal cluster services
export async function probeWebhook(targetUrl: string) {
  return await fetch(targetUrl);
}

Remediated — HTTPS + private/IMDS/IPv6-transition guardrail

terminal · zsh
// TypeScript: blocks non-HTTPS, loopback, RFC1918, IMDS & NAT64/6to4 literals
export async function probeWebhook(targetUrl: string) {
  const safeUrl = assertPublicHttpsUrl(targetUrl);
  return await fetch(safeUrl, { redirect: "error" });
}

Scan your own repository for IMM-SSRF-001 locally (0 code egress)

Preview proposed changes free with ciphermap fix . --dry-run --offline --no-telemetry. Eligibility depends on the installed build, call shape, module format, and migration context. The bundled RSA fixture has a classical key-size candidate; that does not make it post-quantum secure. Persisted digests and unsupported contexts may be declined. Applying supported candidates requires an entitlement, explicit verifier consent, and the required project tools. Review the actual verification result before adopting a change.

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